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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
It is possible that the Missouri Courts will cite the above sentence from
Pearson v. Murray and refuse Gaines' petition for a writ of mandamus to
force his admission into the law school at Missouri University on the ground
of more liberal legislative provisions for negroes in Missouri. The legis-
lative authority given the board of curators of Lincoln University "to pay
the reasonable tuition fees" of negroes sent to the universities of adjacent
states for education not available at Lincoln would appear to permit the
curators to appropriate as much money for tuition fees as they considered
wise. If this authority were exercised, Judge Bond's first reason for holding
inadequate the Maryland provision for colored students would not apply to
the Missouri situation. The Missouri courts would still, however, be con-
fronted with Judge Bond's second and third reasons, viz: the increased
expense which attendance at an outside university would entail despite the
state's payment of tuition fees and the disadvantages of not studying Mis-
souri law primarily and of not being able to attend Missouri courts. These
reasons, however, may not seem substantial to the Missouri judges; and if
they take that view, they may then feel warranted in relying on Lehew v.
Brummel," in which the fact that the petitioner's children had to go three
and a half miles to reach a colored school, while no white child had to go
farther than two miles was held to be no substantial ground for complaint.
A considerable number of other decisions hold that inconvenience in respect
to the place or condition under which educational facilities are provided is
no substantial ground for complaint.12
An alternative remedy of ordering the establishment of a separate law
school for negroes was held not to be available in Pearson v. Murray in the
absence of a legislative declaration of a purpose to establish such a school
or even authority on the part of the state officers to do so. In view of the
Missouri statutory provision that "whenever the board of curators deem it
advisable they shall have the power to open any necessary school or depart-
ment," 3 the Maryland court's reason would lose most of its force in Mis-
souri. Yet it seems most unlikely that in order to avoid admitting one
colored student into the state law school the court would take the drastic
step of ordering the curators of Lincoln University to establish a law
school within the university.
F. F. '38.
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS--PAnT PERFORM-
ANCE OF LAND SALE CONTRACTS.- here services have been rendered as
full consideration for the promise to convey land pursuant to an oral con-
tract when will equity decree specific performance in favor of the party
who has performed? A distinct departure from established Anglo-American
law has been made by the recent Missouri case of Selle v. Selle.1 In this
'1 (1890) 103 Mo. 546, 11 L. R. A. 528, 15 S. W. 765.
12 People v. Gallagher (1883) 93 N. Y. 438; Ward v. Flood (1874) 48
Cal. 36; Dameron v. Bayless (1912) 14 Ariz. 180.
13 R. S. Mo., 1929, s. 9622.
1 (December, 1935) 88 S. W. (2d) 877.
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case the plaintiff sought specific performance of an oral contract with the
deceased by which the latter "then and there promised and agreed with
plaintiff that if he, plaintiff, would take him (the said John Selle) into
his (plaintiff's) home and there keep him and care for him and give him a
home as long as he (the said John Selle) should live, that then plaintiff, upon
the death of the said John Selle would give and leave to him, absolutely
and in fee simple" the land there described.2 In his answer the defendant
invoked the Statute of Frauds, alleging further that the "services covered
a very short time, of said services can easily be determined in dollars and
cents, and adequate relief given at law." The Supreme Court upheld the
contention of the defendant, and ordered the case reversed and remanded
with instructions that plaintiff be given the reasonable value of his services,
for the reason that the consideration given by plaintiff was inadequate and
his services could be adequately compensated for by a money judgment.
The plaintiff was given a lien on the land in question to the extent of the
reasonable value of these services.
From the standpoint of prior decisions both in Missouri and elsewhere
this opinion is open to severe criticism. The plaintiff in this case was seek-
ing the land. It is universally held that land is unique, and a payment of
damages for breach of a land sale contract is inadequate, therefore justify-
ing specific performance of the promise to convey.3 Perhaps in this case
plaintiff was adequately compensated for his services by a money judgment.
It might be said that in any land sale contract where the purchase price
has been paid that a restitution of the amount paid with interest would
adequately repay the promises, making specific performance unnecessary.
But by these contracts the plaintiff is entitled to the land, and since land
is unique, it is not enough merely to restore the parties to their status
as of the time of the contract. The question is, therefore, not whether
2 Quotation from plaintiff's own pleading.
3 Paris v. Haley (1875) 61 Mo. 453; Sutton v. Hayden (1876) 62 Mo.
101; Pomeroy v. Fullerton (1893) 21 S. W. 19, 113 Mo. 440; Collins v.
Harrell (1908) 219 Mo. 279, 118 S. W. 432; Oliver v. Johnson (1911)
238 Mo. 359, 142 S. W. 274; McCall v. Atchley (1914) 256 Mo. 39, 164 S. W.
593; Hayworth v. Hayworth (1921) 236 S. W. 26; Heller v. Jentsch (1924)
303 Mo. 440, 260 S. W. 979. See also Williams v. Williams (1917) 128 Ark. 1,
193 S. W. 82. In Jones v. Jones (Mo. Sup. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 146, the
court held it was no defense to an action for specific performance that
plaintiff had an action for his services in quantum meruit, as such was not
adequate relief. In Hall v. Harris, (1899) 145 Mo. 1. c. 622, the rule is
stated unequivocally that full performance of services by plaintiff takes
the case entirely without the statute. In Berg v. Moreau (1906) 199 Mo.
416, 97 S. W. 901, the court answered defendant's contention that plaintiff
had an adequate remedy in a money judgment, holding: "One trouble with
this view is that it is directed to a court of conscience-a court in which
the jingle of the guineas of a mere dry money recompense cannot cure the
hurts of a broken contract relating to services such as were performed in
this case." In Gupton v. Gupton (1870) 47 Mo. 36, specific performance
was granted although at the time plaintiff agreed to care for promissor, the
latter was seventy-three years of age and very infirm. In this case the
court answered the contention of adequacy of legal remedy by saying: "A
judgment for damages merely would be altogether useless."
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the plaintiff might be given adequate compensation at law for the considera-
tion already paid, but whether a money judgment is an adequate substitute
for the land he was to receive. And the courts have usually held in the
negative. An affirmative holding would unjustly deprive plaintiff of the
benefit of his bargain.
An equally serious objection to the opinion lies in the court's pronounce-
ment on the effect of inadequacy of consideration. The contract was made
on the farm of the promisor, and in pursuance thereof the plaintiff re-
moved and cared for him until he died fourteen days later. Two legal
questions arise, namely: (1) Is adequacy of consideration to be determined
as of the time the contract was made, or as of a later time? (2) Is inade-
quacy of consideration by itself a bar to specific performance?
The court did not determine the adequacy of consideration as of the
time the contract was entered into. However, in the course of its opinion,
the court in referring to the condition of the promisor at the time the
contract was made, said: "His condition, when taken to plaintiff's home,
must not have been considered serious, because a doctor was not called
until August 25th, and the trouble was diagnosed as cancer of the stomach."
The facts indicated that the plaintiff had no reason for believing his per-
formance would last for only a brief time; indeed, on the basis of mortality
tables, as the court indicated, the promisor's life expectancy was 8.65 years,
he being seventy-one years of age. In Berg v. Moreau,4 a Missouri case,
the promisor was seventy-nine years of age at the time he promised to
convey the land in return for care and maintenance for the rest of his life,
and although at that time he was extremely feeble, specific performance
was allowed. In a South Dakota case5 specific performance was granted
although plaintiff had rendered only one month of service and at the time
the contract was made the promisor had chronic dyspepsia and asthma.
The court in the Selle case found that after the promisor's death the con-
sideration performed was inadequate, and for this reason denied specific
performance. The weight of authority, however, is that adequacy of con-
sideration should be determined as of the time the contract was made,6
because the plaintiff should be allowed the benefit of his contract.
But even if the consideration is held to be inadequate, by the weight of
authority this should not have been a bar to specific performance. 7 Inade-
quacy of consideration bars specific performance only when it is so gross
4 (1906) 199 Mo. 416, 97 S. W. 901.
5 Lathrop v. Marble, (1900) 12 S. D. 511, 81 N. W. 885.6 Aldrich v. Aldrich (1919) 287 Ill. 213, 122 N. E. 472; Shannon v.
Freeman (1921) 117 S. C. 480, 109 S. E. 406.
7 Harrison v. Town (1852) 17 Mo. 237; Campbell v. McLaughlin (Mo.
1918) 205 S. W. 18; Strachan v. Drake (1916) 61 Colo. 444, 158 P. 319;
Scott v. Habinch (1919) 188 Ia. 155, 174 N. W. 1; Greenwood v. Green-
wood (1916) 97 Kan. 380, 155 P. 807; Woodworth v. Porter (1923) 224
Mich. 470, 194 N. W. 1015; Moore v. McKillip (1923) 110 Neb. 575, 194
N. W. 465; Nugent v. Smith (1922) 195 N. Y. S. 338, 202 App. Div. 279;
Forect Cemetery Assn. v. Ry. (1920) 12 Oh. App. 501; Welsh v. Ford
(1925) 282 Pa. 96, 127 Atl. 431. See note, 10 Ore. L. Rev. 283 (1931).
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as to be unconscionable or fraudulent, 8 and such was not the situation here.
In holding that mere inadequacy of consideration is in itself a bar to
specific performance the court relied on Walker v. Bohannan.9 a Missouri
case, in which the court said that in order that specific performance be
decreed by equity "the contract must be based upon an adequate and legal
consideration, so that its performance upon the one hand, but not upon the
other, would bespeak an unconscionable advantage and wrong, demanding
in good conscience relief in equity. . ." This statement was not necessary
to the decision in the Walker case, and it is quite possible that what the
court meant was simply that the consideration must be sufficient to support
a promise, a requirement basic in contract law. Such seems to be the
proper interpretation of the term "adequate and legal consideration," used
in the Walker case.
J. C. L. '36.
EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-CHARACTER-IMPEACHMENT.-The credibility of
a witness may universally be impeached by showing that his character for
truth and veracity is bad, and in some jurisdictions inquiries relative to the
general moral character of the witness are permissible as a proper mode
of impeachment.' The courts in these latter jurisdictions faced something
of a dilemma when statutes removing the common law disqualifications al-
lowed the accused in a criminal prosecution to take the stand in his own
8 Bean v. Valle, (1829) 2 Mo. 126; Kirkpatrick v. Wiley (1906) 197 Mo.
123, 95 S. W. 213; Evans v. Evans (1906) 196 Mo. 1, 93 S. W. 969; Holmes
v. Fresh (1845) 9 Mo. 201; Scott v. Habinck (1919) 188 Ia. 155, 174 N.
W. 1. In regard to the whole problem see "Missouri Law on Performance of
Oral Contracts as a Method of Validation when Statute of Frauds Is In-
voked," by Professor Tyrrell Williams in 20 St. Louis Law Rev. 106 (1935).
9 (1912) 243 Mo. 119, 147 S. W. 1024. In this case the following require-
ments were set out: "(1) the alleged oral contract must be clear, explicit,
and definite; (2) it must be proven as pleaded; (3) such contract cannot
be established by conversations either too ancient on the one hand, or too
loose or casual upon the other; (4) the alleged oral contract must itself be
fair and not unconscionable; (5) the proof of the contract as pleaded must
be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the chancellor that
the contract as alleged was in fact made, and that the full performance, so
far as lies in the hands of the parties to perform, has been had; (6) and
the work constituting performance must be such as is referable solely to
the contract sought to be enforced and not such as might be reasonably
referable to some other and different contract; (7) the contract must be
based upon an adequate and legal consideration, so that its performance
upon the one hand, but not upon the other, would bespeak an unconscion-
able advantage and wrong, demanding in good conscience relief in equity;(8) proof of mere disposition to devise by will or convey by deed by way
of gift, or as a reward for services, is not sufficient, but there must be
shown a real contract to devise by will or convey by deed made before the
acts of performance relied upon were had." In this case specific perfor-
mance was denied because the contract was not sufficiently established.
'2 Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 922-923; 28 R. C. L. 622; State vs. Scott
(1933) 332 Mo. 255, 58 S. W. (2d) 275, 90 A. L. R. 860; See also annota-
tion 90 A. L. R. 870.
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